Tomasz Kamusella
Universiteti i Shёn Andreas, Skoci
Studimet ruse nё Perёndim
A i kanё vёnё vetes detyrё dijetarёt perёndimorё tё hulumtojnё Bashkimin Sovjetik dhe Rusinё pёr keqkuptimin e kёsaj tiranie tё gjerё dhe tё aspiratave neoimperiliste tё saj?
Mos vallё, nё vend tё kёsaj, sovjetologёt ia imponojnё Perёndimit qё ta adhurojё, pa e menduar, ҫdo gjё ruse dhe, mbi tё gjitha, atё “letёrsi tё madhe ruse”, madhёshtinё e tё cilёs as qё e vёnё nё pikёpyetje dhe analizё? Mos vallё ata e bindin opinionin publik perёndimor qё, pavarёsisht pavarёsisё sё tyre dhe anёtarёsisё nё NATO dhe nё BE, vendet e Europёs Qendrore dhe Lindore janё “artificiale” dhe, si tё tilla, i pёrkasin sferёs ruse tё ndikimit gjeopolitik?
A tё bind ky qëndrim i keq, i mbajtur deri më sot, nga universitetet dhe grupet e analistëve më të mirë perëndimorë për ta trajtuar rusishten ‘objektivisht’, pra si gjuhë hyrëse e kërkuar për studimin e Europёs Qendrore dhe Lindore dhe tё gjuhёve tё shumta apo kulturave dhe historive kombёtare nё kёtё rajon?
Ёshtё vёrtet e domosdoshme tё mos lejojmё qё interesi neoimperialist rus duhet t’i bёjё Amerikёn Veriore dhe Europёn Perёndimore t’i keq pёrceptojnё aleatёt e tyre nё Europёn Qendrore dhe Lindore?
A ka kuptim kjo? Po, pёr Kremlinin ka kuptim, ёshtё mёnyra mё e mirё pёr ta bёrё Perёndimin tё pranojё ofertёn e Rusisё. Por, mjerisht dhe pa justifikim, krijohet njё gjendje ku kёta shtete konsiderohen si tё shkallёs sё dytё pёr Perёndimin. i zhvlerёsojnё ata, duke evokuar njё “kuptim” te politikanёt perёndimorё qё kёta “shtete sezonale” janё veҫse koloni rrugaҫe tё Rusisё, qё rrinё ose presim me padurim tё rikthehen nё sqetullat e Moskёs.
Lufta e Rusisё nё Ukrainё
Pas invazionit tё pajustifikuar tё Rusisё ndaj Ukrainёs paqёsore nё 2022, nё verё e atij viti, unё ligjёrova nё Universitetin e Hokajdos, nё Sapporo, Japoni, nё Qendrёn e Kёrkimeve Sllavo-Euroaziatike (SRC). Ky ёshtё institucioni mё i vjetёr i vendit pёr gjetjen dhe mbledhjen e tё dhёnave, sё pari, pёr Bllokun Sovjetik dhe tani pёr vendet pas-sovjetike dhe pas-komuniste.
Menjёherё pas kalimit tё fazёs sё pushtimit amerikan tё Japonisё nё vitin 1952, Washingtoni e ktheu kёtё vend nё njё post tё pёrparuar tё Luftёs sё Ftohtё tё Perёndimit. Pёr ta rritё vlerёn si aleat i SHBA, Tokio kish nevojё pёr njё ekspertizё tё besueshme pёr ҫёshtjet sovjetike, pёr domosdoshmёrinё e themelimit tё SRC, me ndihmёn amerikane.
Instituti Rus i Universitetit tё Kolumbias (i ngritur nё 1945, tani i njohur si Instituti Harriman) shёrbeu si njё model i gatshёm. Nё tё dy rastet, Fondacioni Rokfeler siguroi grantet pёrkatёse. Simbolikisht, SRC ёshtё vendosur nё ishullin mё verior tё Hokajdos, tё cilin Kremlini aspironte ta aneksonte ose ta pushtonte nё fund tё Luftёs sё Dytё Botёrore. Nё skenarin e dytё, sovjetikёt do krijonin njё Japoni Veriore komuniste, sikurse bёnё nё rastin e shteteve komuniste tё Koresё sё Veriut dhe Vietnamit tё Veriut. Pёr fatin e Japonisё dhe tё botёs sё lirё, projekti sovjetik dёshtoi.
Studime ruse apo tё zonёs?
Ҫdo vit, nga e tёrё bota, SRC fton dijetarё premtues dhe tё afirmuar qё specializohen nё historinё, kulturёn dhe politikёn e rajonit, tё pёrcaktuar nga bordi i qёndrёs, pikёrisht tё Europёs Qendrore dhe Lindore, bashkё me Azinё Veriore dhe Qendrore.
Gjatё qendrimit tim nё Sapporo, kisha privilegjin tё bisedoja me tё ardhurit e atjeshёm. Lidhur me luftёn qё vijonte nё Ukrainё, ne reflektuam lidhur me pёrdorimin dhe tepёrimin e propagandёs ruse me letёrsinё ruse pёr “justifikimin” e sulmit neokolonialist tё Moskёs ndaj Ukrainёs.
Gjatё bashkёbisedimeve tona rreth “letёrsisё sё madhe ruse” ne treguam dobёsitё e pёrgjithshme tё kёsaj letёrsie. Arma klasike e letёrsisё ruse lavdёrohet gjerёsisht pёr reflektimin e supozuar tё saj universal mbi kushtёzimin njerёzor. (condition humana).
Fushёveprimi i kёsaj arme dhe pёrzgjedhja letrare e karaktereve janё skajshmёrisht tё ngushta, madje tё ngurta. Pavarёsisht qё Rusia cariste ka qenё njё perandori skajshmёrisht shumёetnike dhe shumёfetare, letёrsia klasike ruse pёrqendrohet pёrjashtimisht te shtresa rusofone dhe ortodokese e fisnikёrisё ruse. Dmth vetёm njё ҫereku i fisnikёve tё perandorisё ose gjysёm milioni njerёz, po tё flasim me numra. Nga pikёpamja statistike, mjedisi social i letёrsisё ruse mbulonte 0.3 % tё popullsisё sё perandorisё, qё kishte 166 milionё njerёz nё 1914.
Gjatё periudhёs sovjetike, gjendja nuk u pёrmirёsua dukshёm. Propagandistёt komunistё mbajtёn shumicёn e letёrsisё klasike ruse nё formёn e modelit cilёsor pёr shkrimtarёt sovjetikё, ndёrsa shkolla fillore e detyrueshme duhej tё propagandonte kёtё armё nё mbarё perandorinё sovjetike. Nё njё vijё me politikёn zyrtare tё realizmit socialist nё arte dhe nё lёndёt humanitare, subjekti i letёrsisё sovjetike do tё ishte uniteti i pathyeshёm i punёtorёve dhe i fshatarёve nё tёrё Bashkimin Sovjetik. Nё njё farё mёnyre, fshatarёt dhe punёtorёt nё fjalё ishin pothuajse rusё etnikё, pёrjashtimisht, qё kёndonin kёngё lavdёruese pёr revolucionin bolshevik dhe rolin udhёheqёs tё partisё komuniste tё vendit.
Nё se njё etnik jo rus ecte nё vijёn kolonialiste nё romane ose poema, (pothuaj pёrjashtimisht) ai fliste rusisht. Nga viti 1938, rusishtja perandorake ishte magjepsur nga mёkatet cariste tё imperializmit dhe “shovinizmit rusomadh”. Atёhere rusishtja socialiste iu imponua tёrё popullsisё sovjetike si gjuhё universale e komunikimit ndёretnik dhe pёr tёrё tё ardhmen komuniste botёrore qё po vinte. Si rrjedhojё, tё gjithё qytetarёt sovjetikё kishin pёr detyrё tё flisnin dhe tё shkruanin nё rusisht. Pёr mё tepёr, ata etnikisht jo rusё duhej tё ndiqnin fort kёtё komunizёm njёgjuhёsor me shkrimtarёt e grupeve etnike pёrkatёse. Kёta autorё sovjetikё etnikisht jo rusё duhej ta braktisnin gjuhёn e vet amёtare pёr hir tё gjuhёs komuniste tё rusishtes kur hartonin veprat e tyre letrare. Nёse ata provonin tё “prodhonin” njё roman ose poezi nё gjuhёn amёtare, censorёt nuk do e lejonin qё ajo tё botohej para se tё botohej fillimisht pёrkthimi i tyre nё rusisht.
Periudhёs kalimtare tё lejimit cilёsor tё pёrdorimit tё gjuhёve jo ruse i erdhi fundi shpejt. Nё vitin 1961, Kongresi 22 i Partisё Komuniste tё Bashkimit Sovjetik u shpreh se bashkimi i grupeve etnike tё vendit komunist kishte ecur pёrpara. Kёta tё mёnҫur sovjetikё parashikuan qё kёta grupe tё shumёfishta etnike do tё shkriheshin bashkё nё njё popull tё vetёm jo etnik nga vitit 1980. Ky qe shpallur edhe viti qё, sipas tyre, do ndёrtohej komunizmi nё Bashkimin Sovjetik.
Nё ҫdo mёnyrё njerёzit sovjetikё, tё njё tipi tё ri tё paparё, duhej tё flisnin dhe tё shkruanin nё gjuhёn e vetme komuniste botёrore –rusisht.
Si rezultat, letёrsia ruse, pa mёdyshje dhe qenёsisht, u pёrkushtohej gjerave ruse, pozonte si tё qe “universale” dhe “humaniste”. Nё se dilnin disa personazhe apo tema etnikisht dhe gjuhёsisht jo ruse, ato duhej tё magjepseshin nё mjedisin e rusishtes, ndёrsa ҫuditё e tyre jo komuniste duhej tё transmetoheshin nё format e njohura ruse.
Nevojat ideologjike dhe politike i ndalonin shkrimtarёt sovjetikё nё veprimtari dhe i bёnin ata “ingjinierё tё shpirtёrave” tё planifikuar nga qendra dhe tё kontrolluar nga shteti. Kёshtu, shkrimtarёt etnikё jo rusё privoheshin dyfish nga veprimtaria, jo vetёm pёr temat dhe qasjet e tyre tё pёlqyera, por edhe pёr gjuhёt dhe kulturat e tyre.
Duke shkuar nё vendlindje
Gjatё bashёkbisedimeve tona nё Sapporo, kolegёt e mij ishin tё njё mendje lidhur me kёtё diagnozё tё letёrsisё dhe kulturёs ruse. Ata shtuan se, pas fundit tё komunizmit dhe shkatёrrimit tё Bashkimit Sovjetik, gjendja nuk ndryshoi. “Standardi i artё” i letёrsisё ruse, i futur nё periudhёn cariste dhe sovjetike, vazhdon ende sot, ndonёse njё e pesta e popullsisё sё Federatёs Ruse ёshtё etnikisht jo ruse. Pёr mё tepёr, kjo njё e pesta banon nё katёr tё pestat e territorit tё vendit. Kёshtu, nё tema hapёsinorё, Rusia e sotme ёshtё kryesisht jo ruse. Kёto katёr tё pestat jo ruse paraqesin kolonitё e Rusisё nё kohёn e sotme, ndёrsa metropoli kufizohet me njё tё pestёn europiane, pa Kaukazin. Pa dyshim, disa qytete perandorakё me shumicё etnike ruse i kontrollojnё kёto koloni.
Sidoqoftё, dijetarёt qё diskutuan pёr kёtё karakter tё pa vёnё re socio-kulturor pengues dhe imperialist tё rusishtes- ose tё letёrsisё dhe kulturёs nё gjuhёn ruse- nuk donin ta bёnin publike kёtё diskutim dhe pёrfundim. Ky ngurrim ishte goditës dhe në fillim i vështirë për t’u kuptuar në kontekstin e luftës barbare të Rusisë, të shënuar – siç mësuam atë verë – me masakrat gjenocidale në Bucha dhe Irpin apo rrafshimi me tokёn i qytetit – port tё Mariupolit. Me njё pёrjashtim tё vetёm, asnjё prej kёtyre dijetarёve nuk qe qytetar rus i Mariupolit. Ky i vetёm doli mё i guximshёm se tё tjerёt. Ai e dёnoi luftёn me terma tё pacaktuara, sipas dijenisё sime, duke e braktisur Rusinё.
Habitesha ҫka ishte kaq e rёndёsishme ajo qё mund t’i shmangёte kёta dijetarё perёndimorё nga dalja nё publik kundёr miteve pёr letёrsinё dhe kulturёn ruse nё kohёn kur, me ndihmёn e Perёndimit, Ukraina po luftonte nё kёtё betejё ekzistenciale pёr ta ruajtur shtetin e vet, kombin, gjuhёn dhe kulturёn.
Nё fillim tё invazionit rus, Kremlini skicoi planin e vet neoimperialist pёr nёnshtrimin e Ukrainёs duke ia fshirё emrin asaj nё hartёn e Europёs, duke likuiduar elitёn ukrainase nё kampet e vdekjes, duke i mbyllur ukrainasit nё burgjet-kampe pune tё detyrueshme nё pёrpjekje pёr t’i detyruar ata tё binden se janё “rusё”, duke shpallur tёrё trashёgiminё ukrainase si e pavlerё, si “ruse” dhe duke shkatёrruar gjuhёn dhe kulturёn ukrainase me djegien e librarive dhe bibliotekave nё gjuhёn ukrainase.
Mund tё mendohej qё lufta gjenocidale ruse, bashkuar me gjenocidin e planifikuar kulturor, do tё mjaftonte pёr t’i vёnё nё lёvizje dijetarёt perёndimorё me prirje liberale dhe demokratike tё protestonin me zё tё lartё me gjithё fuqinё e tyre. Por nuk ndodhi asgjё e kёtij lloji. Nё vend tё saj, u ngritёn thirrjet pёr paanёsi. Disa propozuan qё ana tjetёr e “konfliktit” – pikёrisht Rusia- dhe argumentet e saj. duhej tё merreshin nё konsideratё, po ashtu. Kjo lloj qasjeje ndaj pushtuesit dhe gjenocidit do ishte e pamendueshme nё se zbatohej nё rastet e gjenocidit dhe luftёs totale, sikurse e ka njohur historia europiane e shekullit tё njёzetё.
Mbi tё gjitha, asnjё autoritet i ҫdo lloj instance nuk ka bёrё thirrje pёr njё kuptim mё tё thellё dhe pёr nevojёn pёr t’i trajtuar mё mirё “argumentet” domethёnёs (ndonёse tё pashqiptueshёm ose tё menduar gabim) tё nazistёve gjermanё dhe austriakё qё dukshёm nuk u lanё zgjedhje atyre veҫ tё shfarosin hebrenjtё dhe romёt.
Historia dhe qytetërimi dёshmuan se si rusët zhduknin circassianët ose çeçenët, osmanët çrrënjosnin armenët, ose belgët zhduknin gjysmën e popullsisë së Kongos.
Kishte diҫka tё vёshtirё pёr t’u kuptuar nё kёtё ҫёshtje. Cila qe kjo? Duke folur mё shumё, ajo u bё dukshёm mё e qartё se sa natyra miope e orientuar kah Rusia ose madje pro ruse qё i pengoi interlokutorët e mi të bënin gjënë e duhur përtej dënimit tashmë të ritualizuar, por më tepër të tonifikuar dhe gjysmë privat të Kremlinit dhe luftës ‘së tij’ në Ukrainë. Moda ishte qё kritika dhe dёnimi tё bёheshin heshturazi, kёshtu kёto deklarata do ishin jo me dy kuptime ose do lexoheshin dёgjueshёm pёr shёrbyesit civilё rusё me pozitё, qё kёrkojnё “agjentё tё huaj” nё internet me pikёpamje “jo korrekte” pёr “operacion luftarak special”. Dukej kjo si njё valle e llogaritur e lёvozhgave tё vezёve.
Njё dijetar shpresonte tё mos shmangej nga qasja nё arkivin rus pas lufte (bёhet mё pak intensiv). Njё tjetёr donte tё largonte ҫfarёdo kritike tё mundёshme qё mund tё ngrihej ndaj teksteve mёsimore tё pёrtrira tё rusishtes ose tё bashёkautorit etnik jo rus. Njё akademik tjetёr kishte merak se mos ngritja e temave tё tilla do pakёsonte studentёt e rusishtes dhe Rusisё, qё ndiqnin programet nё universitetet e vendit tё vet. Pёr kurreshti, tё gjitha shpresat dhe frikёrat qarkullonin rreth kёrkimeve pёr Rusinё dhe msimdhёnien e rusishtes.
Pa e menduar shumё kёtё zhvillim, tё gjithё dijetarёt u bёnё profesionistё ose emocionalisht tё varur nga Federata Ruse dhe institucionet e saj, pavarёsisht sa i tmerrshёm dhe ҫnjerёzor ishte Kremlini nё vepra dhe vendime.
Sikur kërkimet mbi historinë sovjetike dhe ruse (të paktën cariste) nuk ishin tё mundura në asnjë vend tjetër pas-sovjetik apo në një shtet pas-komunist, i cili dikur ishte një koloni në Perandorinë Ruse. Ende mё e ҫuditshme ishte ky ngulmim njёjёs pёr gjuhёn dhe kulturёn ruse, sikur armenishtja, estonishtja, kirkizishtja, ukrainishtja apo uzbekishtj tё mos ishin gjuhё zyrtare republikane nё Bashkimin Sovjetik. Dijetarёt dolёn miopё pёr sa i pёrket gjuhёve tё tjera cariste dhe tё bllokut sovjetik ku kishte me tepri vepra letrare dhe dokumente historike. Pёr shembull, si nё Rusinё Cariste, ashtu ehe nё Bllokun Sovjetik, gjermanishtja dhe polonishtja i pёrkisnin kёtij grupi gjuhёsh.
(Pas) sovjetologjia apo studimet e fshehta ruse?
Mëkati origjinal i pasluftës lidhur me fushën e studimeve të zonës – i njohur gjerësisht si sovjetologji apo vёzhgim i Kremlinit- ka qenё vatёrzimi pёr gjuhёn dhe kulturёn ruse, krahas me lidhjet sociale qё u futёn nё mes nga rusёt etnikё (dmth sllavofonё ose ortodoksё), ose Ruskije nё mjedisin e rusishtes. Kjo prirje u tregua nё vetё emrin e qendrёs flamurtare kёrkimore tё parё tё themeluar nё 1946, pikёrisht Instituti i Univeresitetit tё Kolumbias nё Nju Jork.
Objektivi i kёrkimit tё sovjetologёve ishte ndihma pёr SHBA, NATO dhe aleatёt e tyre nё mbarё botёn (Japoni, Kore e Jugut) duke pasur nё tematikё Bashkimin Sovjetik, vendet e Bllokut Komunist dhe vendet e tjera komuniste aleate te Moskёs ose Kinёs Komuniste.
Por shumё dijetarё tё kёsaj fushe investuan jo reflektivisht pёr subjektin e kёrkimit tё tyre, duke iu referuar nё rritje thjesht “Rusisё” nga piёkpamja historike dhe demografike. Ky kufizim i ndalonte tё vёshtronin pёrtej metropoleve etnikisht ruse tё Perandorisё sovjetike, ndёrsa tutorёt e tyre e ngushtonin studimin e tyre dhe udhёtimet konferenciale te dy qytetet etnikisht ruse mё tё mёdhenj tё shtetit komunist, pikёrisht nё Moskё dhe Leningrad (Shёn Pjetёrsburg).
Ky investim nё ҫёshtjet elite ruse ose tё karakterit imperial pёr gjuhёt dhe kulturat jo ruse nё Bashkimin Sovjetik dhe nё mbarё bllokun sovjetik ushqente njё verbёri serioze akademike.
Kur nё vitin 1970 dijetari jo konformist Andrej Amalrik prognozoi qё Bashkimi Sovjetik nuk do mbijetonte pas vitit 1984, teza e tij nuk zgjoi shumё diskutime, sikurse duhej tё kishte. Sovjetologёt- sikurse ideologёt e komunizmit sovjetik- ishin tё bindur qё ky shtet komunist ishte bllok graniti dhe do qendronte pёr shumё e shumё breza.
Asnjё sovjetolog i vetёm nuk shkroi njё monografi, ose tё paktёn njё artikull gazete rreth shkatёrrimit tё mundёshёm tё komunizmit dhe tё bllokut sovjetik ose tё vetё Bashkimit Sovjetik pёrpara atyre ngjarjeve tё mёdha tё fund-shekullit 20. Sidoqoftё, paskёtaj shumica nxituan për të ‘shpëtuar’ fushën e tyre duke pasur parasysh zhdukjen e lëndës së saj kërkimore. Mund tё mendohej se ata do binin sёrish nё arritjet e mendimit dekolonialist dhe nё studime pas-kolonialiste.
Mbi tё gjitha, nё mёnyrё strukturore dhe nё praktikёn e tyre ditore si hulumtues tё Bashkimit Sovjetik dhe Bllokut Sovjetik, ata ngritёn de facto perandorinё ruse, tё sunduar me grusht tё fortё nga Moska.
Nё vend tё kёsaj, sovjetologёt rishpikёn vetё, hulumtime nё fushat e mbivendosura dhe zakonisht tё formuluara rishtazi tё nacionalizmit, postkomunizmit dhe studimeve post sovjetike, por nё mёnyrё simptomatike me njё vatёrzim tё qartё hapёsinor te Rusia, krahas Europёs Qendrore dhe Lindore (ose edhe “Euroaziatike”). Me kёtё kapacitet, shumё vetё u bёnё ekspertё dhe komentatorё lajmesh nё luftёrat jugosllave, si fundi postkomunist i pastrimit etnik dhe i genocidit nё Europё. Ndёrkohё, njё dёbim i stёrmadh i ngjashёm, me motive etnike dhe i paparё, i turqёve nga Bullgaria, verёn e 1989 i shpёtoi tёrёsisht vёmёndjes sё tyre. Epo, nё atё kohё ekzistonte ende blloku sovjetik i fortё dhe i qendrueshёm. Prandaj ata nuk kishin nevojё tё gёrmonin nё njё ngjarje kaq “tё vockёl” sikurse kjo “gjё e imёt” e pastrimit etnik nga Bullgaria.
Zhdukja e papritur e subjektit tё kёrkimit tё tyre u shkaktoi sovjetologёve shumё dёme metodologjike dhe organizative. Ata hoqёn dorё nga mendimi i mёparshёm (me ndonjё referencё ndaj mendimit postkolonial), dhe adoptuan njё rithurrje tё llojit tё arnave pёr kёtё tё fundit. Si rezultat, shumё institute tё dikurshme ose tё themeluara rishtazi tё studimeve komuniste sovjetike morёn emra tё rrinj tepёr tё gjatё dhe konfuzё me akronime tё pashqiptueshme. Pёr shembull, Universiteti i Shёn Andreas ka Qendrёn pёr Studimet Ruse, Sovjetike, tё Europёs Qendrore dhe Lindore (CRSCEES), ndёrsa nё Universitetin e Glasgout, Qendra e Aberdinit pёr Historinё Ruse dhe Europiano-Lindore (ACREEH) pranё Universitetit tё Aberdinit.
Ndryshime tё tilla prekin edhe titujt e revistave sovjetologe kryesore. Pёr shembull, nё 1991 Revista e Studimeve Komuniste u transformua nё Revistёn e Studimeve Komuniste dhe Tranzicionin, para se tё fitojё njё emёr tё ri, Politikat e Europёs Lindore nё vitin 2012. Po kёshtu, nё 1992, Studimet pёr Komunizmin e Krahasuar u bёnё Studime Komuniste dhe pas Komuniste, ndёrsa njё vit mё vonё, Studime Sovjetike u riemёrua si Studime Europё-Azi. Pёr fat, pёr kёta sovjetologё qё vazhduan ose lёvizёn drejt hulumtimeve nacionaliste, titulli i revistёs sё tyre flamurtare Letra Kombёsish (themeluar nё 1972) nuk pati nevojё pёr ndonjё riemёrim. Sidoqoftё, u themeluan revista tё reja pёr kёtё temё qё kishin mё shumё hapёsirё pёr publikimin e pikёpamjeve tё tyre, pikёrisht Kombet dhe Kombёtarizmi nё 1995 ose Identitetet Kombёtare, katёr vite mё pas.
Njё taktikё tjetёr u adoptua nga Instituti i dikurshёm i Studimeve Rajonale, pikёrisht Instituti Rus i Universitetit tё Kolumbias. Nё 1982 ai u riemёrua sipas atij qё e financoi (W. Averell Harriman) si Instituti Harriman, kёshtu qё mbiemri “Rus” mund tё hiqej nё atё kohё acarimesh tё Luftёs sё Ftohtё. Pasi Perёndimi siguroi fitoren e papritur nё kёtё luftё, dhjetё vjet mё pas, “ndёn-emri” shpjegues “rus, euroaziatik dhe Studime tё Europёs Lindore” iu shtua emrit tё institutit.
Shpejt, institutet e tjera tё mirёvendosura sovjetologjike e ndoqёn kёtё stil, duke rishpikur emra tё tyre dhe fusha me emrin kod “Euroazia”, nё 2010, Shoqata Amerikane pёr Pёrparimet e Studimeve Sllave (AAASS), e ndёrroi emrin nё Shoqata pёr Studimet Sllave, Europolindore dhe Euroaziatike (ASEEES).
Tre vjet mё pas, Qendra e Universitetit tё Birmingamit pёr Studimet Ruse dhe tё Europёs Lindore e ndryshoi akronimin e qendrёs nё CREES. Nё 2014, Qendra e Kёrkimeve Sllave tё Universitetit tё Hokajdos ndoqi taktikё tё njёjtё, duke e mbivendosur emrin e saj nё Qendrёm e Kёrkimeve Sllavo-Euroaziatike. Akronimi mbeti i pandryshuar.
Larja Ukrainase
Kёto ndryshime me EuroAzinё kanё zgjuar shumё gёzim ndёr ideologёt tё Euroazismit tё vendeve pas sovjetike. Jam i sigurt qё favoriti i presidentit diktator rus euroazianist dhe ideologu i imperializmit rus, Aleksandёr Dugin, do ta miratonte. Kёshtu do bёnte presidenti i parё i Kazakistanit tё pavaruer, Nursulltan Nazarbajev, qё nё 1996 themeloi Universitetin Kombёtar Euroaziatik nё kryeqytetin e vendit nё Astana (Akmola).
Gjithҫka qё ndryshoi mbeti e njёjtё. Kёta institute tё larmishёm tё riemёrtuar tё Studimeve Sllave, tё Europёs Qendrore dhe Lindore, Postkomuniste, Kombёtariste dhe Euroaziatike, nё shumicёn e rasteve, vazhduan tё vatёrzohen nё gjuhёn dhe kulturёn ruse sikurse praktikohen nё qendrat metropolitane nё Msokё dhe Shёn Pjetёrsburg. Më shqetësuese, me rritjen e ideologjisë neoimperialiste të maskuar të Moskës, disa institute kёrkimore perёndimore nisёn tё hynё nё patneritet me fondacionin eponim tё Kremlinit, tё ngritur nё 2007. Pёr shembull, nё 2010, ( pёr botёn ruse), nё Universitetin e Edinburgut, u hap njё degё e Fondacionit tё Botёs Ruse. Por, me qёllim qё tё mos e magjepsё shoqatёn e padёshiruar ideologjike dhe financiare me paratё e oligarkёve rusё, ai u quajt si Qendra Ruse e Princeshёs Dashkova sipas njё figure ruse cariste tё shekullit 18, princeshёs Ekaterina Dashkova.
Kohët e fundit, në Universitetin e Edinburgut u bë një pasqyrim i paqëndrueshëm i këtij kursi. Si rezultat, Qendra Dashkova botoi një vëllim me përkthime ruse të tregimeve në gjuhën ukrainase për luftën në vazhdim. Pra, pa u futur thellё nё studimet ukrainase dhe paskoloniale nё mbarё hapёsirёn pas-sovjetike, ky zhvillim disi pozitiv duket si njё ‘larje ukrainase”. Me vonesë, por me shpresë, kongresi i ardhshëm i vitit 2023 i Shoqatës për studimet sllave, europolindore dhe euroaziatike (ASEEES) premton njё shkёputje tё plotё nga paraja korruptuese e oligarkёve tё Kremlinit gjatё tridhjetё vjetёve tё fundit pas rёnies sё komunizmit
Tema e kёtij kongresi ёshtё dekolonializimi. Ukraina ёshtё vendosur nё zemrёn e ngjarjes, ndёrsa lufta e Rusisё kundёr kёtij vendi do analizohet thellё si njё pёrpjekje e pёrgjakshme e Kremlinit neoimperialist dhe nё thelb gjenocidal pёr tё pёrmbysur dekolonizimin e gjerё paqёsor tё 1991 tё Bashkimit Sovjetik apo vetё Perandorisё Sovjetike.
Studimet ukrainase, paskolonizmi sovjetik dhe neoimperializmi rus
Mbase shpejt, nёse ndonjё qendёr ose revistё don tё vazhdojё tё vatёrzohet nё gjёrat ruse, fusha e saj do lajmёrohet me njё tabelё pёr imperializmin rus dhe sovjetik. Po kёshtu, Europa Qendrore dhe Lindore (pёrfshi Kaukazin) do tё futet nё rubrikёn e studimeve europiane. Dhe nёse njё vend, si Ukraina, do fitojё mё shumё vёmёndje, qё e meriton, zgjedhja e qartё e emrit do jetё ose studime ukrainase ose histori dhe politikё ukrainase. Ngjashёm studimet sllave nuk do tё qendёrzohen mё nё gjuhёn dhe kulturёn ruse. Njё nёndarje e studimeve sllave do shqyrtojё jo vetёm rusishten por edhe gjuhёt e tjera sllave.
Besoj, nё dritёn e luftёs nё Ukrainё, qё ka domethёnie ekzistenciale pёr Europёn demokratike, gjuha ukrainase dhe kultura ukrainase duhet tё marrё pёrparёsi. Ndihma europiane dhe perёndimore pёr Ukrainёn dhe bashkёvrpimi i ngushtё me kёtё vend do arrihen plotёsisht vetёm kur ushtarёt e NATO-s, zyrtarёt e BE dhe dijetarёt perёndimirё qё pёrgjigjen pёr kёto lidhje, do komunikojnё me partnerёt e tyre ne ukrainishten e rrjedhshme dhe idiomatike, duke pasur parasysh letёrsinё, kulturёn dhe historinё e Ukrainёs.
Korrik 2023
Pёrktheu Bardhyl Selimi, 20 korrik 2023
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Going Native: Russian Studies in the West
Tomasz Kamusella
West’s endorsement of Russian imperialism
Did Western scholars tasked with researching the Soviet Union and Russia contribute to the West’s misunderstanding of this vast tyranny and its neoimperial aspirations? Did sovietologists instead imbue the West with unthinking adulation of all things Russian, and above all, of this ‘great Russian literature,’ whose greatness one is permitted neither to question nor analyze? Did they eventually convince the Western public opinion that despite their independence and membership in NATO and the EU, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are ‘artificial’ and as such still belong to Russia’s sphere of geopolitical influence?
Does this nefarious but hardly realized attitude convince to this day even the best Western universities and think tanks to treat Russian ‘objectively,’ that is, as the required entry language for studying Central and Eastern Europe and the region’s numerous languages or national cultures and histories? Is it really necessary that the Russian neoimperial interest must constitute the spectacles through which North America and Western Europe need to misperceive their allies in Central and Eastern Europe? Does it make sense?
Yes, it does for the Kremlin, which the better may make the West to do Russia’s bidding. But sadly and unjustifiably, the situation casts Central and Eastern European countries as second-class states in the West’s eyes. It makes them subaltern, evoking an ‘understanding’ among some Western politicians that these ‘season polities’ are nothing more than Russia’s wayward colonies or provinces, posed or even impatiently waiting for return to Moscow’s fold.
Russia’s war on Ukraine
After the unprovoked Russian invasion on peaceful Ukraine in 2022, in the summer, I did research at Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan in the Center for Slavic-Eurasian Research (SRC). It is the country’s oldest institution for delving into and gathering intelligence about, first, the Soviet bloc, and now the post-Soviet and postcommunist countries. Immediately after the wrapping up of the postwar US occupation of Japan in 1952, Washington turned this country into a stalwart of the West in the Cold War confrontation. To increase its value as a US ally, Tokyo needed trusted expertise on all matters Soviet, necessitating the founding of the SRC, with was accomplished with much American help.
Columbia University’s Russian Institute (established in 1946, now known as Harriman Institute) served as a ready-made model. In both cases, the Rockefeller Foundation extended appropriate grants. Symbolically, the SRC was located in Japan’s northernmost island of Hokkaido, which the Kremlin had aspired either to annex or occupy at the end of World War II. In the latter scenario, the Soviets would have created a communist North Japan, as they did in the case of the communist polities of North Korea and North Vietnam. Fortunately for Japan and the free world, the Soviet designs were thwarted.
Russian or Area studies?
Each year, from all around the world, the SRC invites promising and established scholars, who specialize in history, culture and politics of the region as defined by the center’s spatial remit, namely Central and Eastern Europe, together with Northern and Central Asia. During my scholarly sojourn in Sapporo, I had the privilege to talk to the current contingent. In context of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war, we reflected on the Russian propaganda’s uses and abuses of Russian literature for ‘justifying’ Moscow’s neocolonial onslaught on Ukraine.
In the course of our conversations on the unreflectively dubbed ‘great Russian literature,’ we spotted this literature’s not commonly noticed weaknesses. The classical cannon of the Russian belles lettres is popularly lauded for its supposedly universal reflection on condicio humana. Yet, this canon’s scope and the literature’s selection of characters are extremely narrow, and even bigoted. Despite the fact that tsarist Russia was an extremely polyethnic and multiconfessional empire, classical Russian literature zooms exclusively on the Russophone and Orthodox subset of the Russian nobility. It translated to a mere quarter of all the empire’s nobles, or just half a million people in purely numerical terms. From the statistical point of view, the social milieu of Russian literature covered 0.3 percent of the empire’s population that counted 166 million in 1914.
During the Soviet period, the situation did not improve markedly. Communist propagandists retained most of classical Russian literature in the form of a high quality benchmark for Soviet writers, while compulsory elementary school was to propagate this cannon throughout the Soviet empire. In line with the official policy of socialist realism in arts and humanities, Soviet literature’s subject was to be peasants ‘in an unbreakable class union’ with workers from across the Soviet Union. Somehow, peasants and workers in question turned out to be almost exclusively ethnic Russians (Russkie), who sang praises of the bolshevik revolution and the leading role of the country’s communist party. If an ethnic non-Russian had a colonial-like walk-on in a novel or poem, (almost exclusively) he spoke in Russian.
By 1938, imperial Russian had been supposedly exorcised of its tsarist sins of imperialism and ‘Great Russian chauvinism.’ Then socialist Russian was imposed on all the Soviet population as the universal language of interethnic communication for the entire world’s coming communist future. Subsequently, all Soviet citizens were required to speak and write in Russian. Furthermore, those of ethnically non-Russian extraction were to be firmly led toward this monolingual communism by their respective ethnic groups’ writers. These ethnically non-Russian Soviet authors had to abandon their native language in favor of the communist language of Russian for composing their literary works. Should they unwisely choose to ‘produce’ a novel or poetry in such a native language, censors would not allow it to be published before its Russian translation came off the press first.
The transitory period of a qualified permission for the use of non-Russian languages was to come to an end soon. In 1961, the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union opined that the coming together (сближение sblizhenie) of the communist country’s ethnic groups (национальности natsional’nosti ‘nationalities’) was progressing apace. These Soviet wisemen foresaw that a merger (слияние sliianie) of these multiple ethnic groups into a novel post- or non-ethnic single communist people (народ narod) would be achieved by 1980. This was also the year by when communism would have been built in the Soviet Union. One way or another, the Soviet communist people of a new and unprecedented type were to speak and write the world’s single communist language of Russian.
As a result, Soviet literature was unabashedly and essentially devoted to things Russian, posed as ‘universal’ and ‘humanistic.’ If some ethnically or linguistically non-Russian characters or topics appeared they had to be exorcised in the medium of Russian, while their un-communist-like strangeness needed to be recast in culturally familiar Russian guises. Ideology and political needs deprived Soviet writers of agency and made them into centrally-planned and state-controlled ‘engineers of souls.’ Yet, ethnically non-Russian Soviet writers were doubly deprived of agency, not only of their favored topics and approaches, but altogether of their languages and cultures.
Going native
During our conversations in Sapporo, my colleagues arrived at and largely agreed with this diagnosis of Russian literature and culture. They added that after the end of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union hardly anything has changed. The ‘golden standard’ of Russian literature encased in imperial-like and elitist Russian of the tsarist and Soviet periods continues to this day, despite a fifth of the Russian Federation’s inhabitants being ethnically non-Russian. What is more, they inhabit the Asian and Caucasian four-fifths of the country’s territory. So, in spatial terms today’s Russia is overwhelmingly non-Russian. These non-Russian four-fifths denote present-day Russia’s colonies, while the metropolis is limited to the European one-fifth, less the Caucasus. Obviously, some imperial cities with ethnically Russian (or rather creole) pluralities or even majorities dot and effectively control these colonies.
However, the scholars who discussed this unnoticed socioculturally stunted and imperialist character of Russian – or rather, Russian-language – literature and culture did not want to go public with this discussion and its conclusions. This reluctance was striking and at first hard to grasp in the context of Russia’s barbaric war, marked – as we learned this summer – with the genocidal massacres in Bucha and Irpin or the razing to the ground of the city port of Mariupol. With a single exception, none of these scholars were Russian citizens. Actually, this one who was, turned out to be more forthcoming than the rest. He condemned the war in no uncertain terms and, to my knowledge, left Russia.
I wondered what was of such importance that might prevent these Western scholars from parsing in public the cherished myths of Russian literature and culture during the time when, with the West’s support, Ukraine was fighting this existential war for preserving its state, nation, language and culture. At the beginning of the Russian invasion, the Kremlin sketched out its neoimperial plan of subjugating Ukraine by erasing its name from the map of Europe, liquidating the Ukraine elite in deathcamps, incarcerating Ukrainians in forced labor concentration camps in an effort to convince them that they were ‘Russians,’ reclaiming all Ukrainian heritage deemed of value as ‘Russian,’ and by destroying Ukrainian language and culture through burning all Ukrainian-language libraries and books.
One would think that Russia’s genocidal war, coupled with this planned cultural genocide, would be more than enough to move any Western scholar of liberal and democratic persuasion to protest loudly at the top of their lungs. Nothing of this kind happened. Instead, appeals for impartiality were voiced. Some proposed that the other side of the ‘conflict’ – namely, Russia – and its arguments ought to be taken into consideration, as well. This type of lenient approach to the invader and genocidaire would have been unthinkable if applied to the cases of genocide and total war, as known from twentieth-century European history. After all, no authorities of any stripes appeal for more understanding and the necessity to try to better comprehend ‘arguments’ (however unpalatable and wrongheaded) of German and Austrian nazis that apparently left them no choice but to exterminate Jews and Roma. That nothing doing, but history and civilization alone compelled Russians to wipe out Circassians or Chechens, Ottomans to eradicate Armenians, or Belgians to wipe out half of Congo’s population.
Something hard to comprehend was at issue. What was it? With more talking, it became increasingly clearer that the myopically Russia-oriented or even pro-Russian nature of the field prevented my interlocutors from doing the decent thing beyond the already ritualized but rather toned-down and semi-private condemnation of the Kremlin and ‘its’ war in Ukraine. The mode was low-key, to criticize and condemn silently, so such statements would not be unambiguous or readily hearable to relevant Russian civil servants searching the web for ‘foreign agents’ with ‘incorrect’ views on the ‘special military operation.’ It looked like a calculated dance on eggshells.
One scholar hoped not to be prevented from accessing a Russian archive after the war (becomes less intensive). Another wanted to deflect any potential criticisms that might be levelled against the researcher’s innovative textbook of Russian or its ethnically Russian co-author. A further academic was wary that coming out on the topics broached in our discussions might hurt recruitment for Russian and Russia-related programs at the home university. Curiously, all the hopes and fears circulated around research on Russia and Russian language teaching. Without giving too much thought to the development, all the scholars became professionally or even emotionally dependent on the Russian Federation and its institutions, no matter whatever horrible and inhumane the Kremlin may be in its deeds and decisions.
As though doing research on Soviet and Russian (at least tsarist) history would not be possible in any other post-Soviet country or a postcommunist polity, which used to be a colony in the Russian Empire. Even more strange was this singular insistence on Russian language and culture, as if Armenian, Estonian, Kyrgyz, Ukrainian or Uzbek were not official republican languages in the Soviet Union. The scholars appeared to be short-sighted in regard of other tsarist and Soviet bloc official languages in which belles lettres and historical documents abound. For example, both in tsarist Russia and in the Soviet bloc, German and Polish belonged to this group of languages.
(Post-)Sovietology or concealed Russian studies?
The original sin of the novel postwar applied field of area studies – popularly known as Sovietology or Kremlin watching – was its circumscribed focus on Russian language and culture, alongside social relations and politics as conducted among and by ethnic (that is, Slavophone and Orthodox) Russians, or Russkiie (Русские) in the medium of Russian. This tendency was indicated in the very name of the field’s first-ever flagship research center founded in 1946, namely, the Russian Institute at Columbia University in New York.
The goal of sovietologists’ research was to assist the United States, NATO and their allies across the world (Japan and South Korea, including) in containing the Soviet Union, the Soviet bloc countries, and other communist countries allied with Moscow or communist China. But many scholars in the field got unreflectively invested in the subject of their research, increasingly fondly referred to with the historically and demographically incorrect shorthand ‘Russia.’ This shorthand tended to limit their gaze to the Soviet empire’s ethnically Russian metropolis, while their Soviet chaperons restricted their study and conference trips even more, to the communist polity’s two largest and ethnically Russian cities, namely, Moscow and Leningrad (St Petersburg).
This investment in elitist things Russian and imperial-like snub for the non-Russian languages and cultures in the Soviet Union and across the Soviet bloc engendered serious academic blindness. When in 1970 Soviet maverick scholar Andrei Amalrik proposed that the Soviet Union may not survive beyond 1984, his thesis did not evoke much discussion, as it should have. Sovietologists – like ideologues of Soviet communism – were convinced that this communist polity was rock-solid and here to stay for innumerable generations to come.
Not a single certified sovietologist authored a monograph, or at least a learned journal article, about the impending collapse of communism and the Soviet bloc or the coming breakup of the Soviet Union prior to these momentous events of the late 20th century. However, afterward most participated in the rush to ‘save’ their field in view of the disappearance of its research subject matter. One would think that they could fall back on the achievements of decolonial thought and postcolonial studies. After all, structurally and in their day-to-day practices in the Soviet Union and its Soviet bloc constituted a de facto Russian empire ruled a tight fist from Moscow.
Instead, sovietologists reinvented themselves as researchers in the parallel, overlapping and usually newly-formulated fields of nationalism, postcommunist and post-Soviet studies, but symptomatically with a clear-cut spatial focus on Russia, alongside Central and Eastern Europe, with Central Asia (or even ‘Eurasia’) added as an aftethought. In this capacity, many became experts and news commentators on the Yugoslav wars, or the postcommunist nadir of ethnic cleansing and genocide in Europe. But somehow, a very similar ethnically motivated huge and unprecedentedly intensive expulsion of Turks from Bulgaria in the summer of 1989 completely escaped their attention. Well, at that time the traditional subject of their research, namely, the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc still existed solid and intact. Hence, they did not need to steep to such a ‘minor’ event as this ‘little matter’ of Bulgarian ethnic cleansing.
The unexpected disappearance of the subject of their research caused sovietologists much methodological and organizational grief. They resigned on rethinking the former (with hardly any reference to postcolonial thought), while adopted a patchwork-style makeshift approach to the latter. As a result, many extant or freshly-founded institutes of Soviet or communist studies received new torturously long and confusing names with unpronounceable acronyms. For instance, the University of St Andrews is home to the Centre for Russian, Soviet, Central and East European Studies (CRSCEES), while at the University of Glasgow, the Centre for Russian, Central and East European Studies (CRCEES) is active, or the Aberdeen Centre for Russian and East European History (ACREEH) at Aberdeen University.
Such changes did not omit titles of leading sovietologist journals. For example, in 1991 the Journal of Communist Studies morphed into the Journal of Communist Studies and Transition, before opting for a brand new name, East European Politics, in 2012. Likewise, in 1992, Studies in Comparative Communism became Communist and Post-Communist Studies, whereas a year later, Soviet Studies were renamed as Europe-Asia Studies. Fortunately for these sovietologists who continued or moved to researching nationalism, the title of their flagship journal Nationalities Papers (founded in 1972) did not need any overhaul. However, they founded new journals on this topic to have more place for publishing their research output, namely, Nations and Nationalism in 1995 or National Identities four years later.
Another tactic was adopted by the original Area Studies institution, namely, Columbia University’s Russian Institute. In 1982 it was renamed after its benefactor W. Averell Harriman as the Harriman Institute, so the adjective ‘Russian’ could be conveniently dropped at the new height of the Cold War confrontation. Following the West’s unexpected victory in this war, a decade later, the explicatory ‘subname’ of ‘Russian, Eurasian, and East European Studies’ was added to the institute’s name.
Soon, other well-established sovietologist institutions followed the suit, reinventing their names and fields with the codename ‘Eurasia.’ For instance, in 2010, the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS) changed its name to the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES). Three years later, Birmingham University’s Centre for Russian and East European Studies became the Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies, without any changes to the centre’s acronym, CREES. In 2014, Hokkaido University’s Slavic Research Center followed the same tactics, overhauling its name to the Slavic-Eurasian Research Center. The acronym remained unchanged.
Ukrainian-washing
These changes with Eurasia at their heart must have evoked much glee among ideologues of Eurasianism in post-Soviet countries. I am sure that the Russian President-cum-Dictator’s favorit Eurasianist and ideologue of Russian imperialism, Alexander Dugin, would approve. So, would be pleased independent Kazakhstan’s first president Nursultan Nazarbayev, who in 1996 founded the Eurasian National University in the country’s new capital of Astana (Akmola).
All had to change to remain the same. These variously rebranded institutes of Slavic, Central and Eastern European, Postcommunist, Nationalism, and Eurasian Studies in most cases continued to be focused on Russian language and culture as practiced in Russia’s metropolitan center in Moscow and St Petersburg. Most worryingly, with the rise of Moscow’s barely disguised neoimperial ideology of the Russian world (Русский мир Russkii mir), some Western research institutes began entering partnerships with the Kremlin’s eponymous foundation, established in 2007. For instance, in 2010, at the University of Edinburgh, a branch of the Russkii Mir Foundation was opened. But in order to exorcise the unwanted ideological and financial association with oligarchic Russian money, it was named as the Princess Dashkova Russian Centre after an 18th-century tsarist figure of culture, Princess Ekaterina Dashkova.
Some reflection on the untenability of this course took place recently at Edinburgh University. As a result, the Dashkova Centre published a volume with Russian translations of Ukrainian-language stories about the ongoing war. Yet, without a deeper involvement with Ukrainian and postcolonial studies across the post-Soviet space, this rather positive development looks a bit like ‘Ukrainian-washing.’ Belatedly but hopefully, the forthcoming 2023 congress of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES) promises a clear cut with the fuzzy cozying to the Kremlin and oligarchs’ corrupt money during the past three decades after the fall of communism. This congress’s topic is decolonization. Ukraine is placed at the event’s heart, while Russia’s war against this country is aptly analyzed as neoimperial Moscow’s bloody and in essence genocidal attempt at reversing the largely peaceful 1991 big-bang decolonization of the Soviet Union or rather the Soviet empire.
Ukrainian studies, Soviet postcolonialism and Russian neoimperialism
Perhaps, soon, if a center or journal wishes to continue focusing on things Russian, its field will be announced by the non-fudging label of Russian and Soviet imperialism. Likewise, Central and Eastern Europe (including the Caucasus) will be subsumed under the clear-cut rubric of European studies. And if a country, like Ukraine, is at long last given more attention as it should, the obvious choice of a name is either Ukrainian studies or Ukrainian history and politics. Similarly, the obfuscating designation of Slavic studies should no longer serve to conceal the intended focus on Russian language and culture. A department of Slavic studies to be what its name announces, it needs to offer full-fledged study tracks in other Slavic languages than Russian.
I believe that in light of this Russian war on Ukraine, which is of existential significance for democratic Europe, Ukrainian language and culture must be given priority. European and Western help for Ukraine and close cooperation with this country will be fully achieved only when NATO soldiers, EU officials and Western scholars responsible for these ties will be able to communicate with their partners in fluent and idiomatic Ukrainian, with full awareness of Ukrainian literature, culture, and history.
July 2023
